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ABSTRACT
This thesis attempts to provide a prescriptive framework for incentive
plans designed for the top management of large companies, along with
rules for the implementation of the framework. First the objectives of
management are defined in theory. It is then shown that existing com-
pensation is related more to corporate size than to the achievement of
shareholder objectives. Existing incentive compensation plans are
examined and criticised for often encouraging managers to pursue their
own objectives. A new method of compensation is proposed, using the
capital asset pricing model from financial theory, along with a more
simplified approach based on the same assumptions. Finally some empiri-
cal work shows that for large companies there is little or no relation-
ship between the pay of the chief executive officer and performance
towards the achievement of shareholder objectives.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
This thesis is concerned with the compensation packages of top
executives of large companies in the U.S.A. Although much of the material
is descriptive of current practise, the primary purpose of this thesis
is to develop a theoretical framework that is prescriptive. In a society
which believes largely in free markets for labor a large element of the
total compensation package will be dictated by the forces of supply and
demand, thus the framework developed here is directed towards the incen-
tive element of compensation over and above that which is necessary to
secure and retain managerial services.
In financial theory shareholders are content to delegate all the
decisions of the firm to management under the assumption that management
will always act in the interest of the shareholders. This separation
theorem will not hold if management is perceived by shareholders to be
acting primarily in its own interest, or in the interest of employees,
or even in the interest of society as a whole. This is not to deny that
it may well be in the interest of shareholders for management to satisfy
the needs of employees or to fulfil social obligations, it is merely to
say that such actions should only be pursued if the interest of the share-
holders is thereby served better than by not pursuing them. If these con-
ditions are fulfilled then shareholders can retire gracefully into the
background, and furthermore it can be argued that shareholder 'apathy' is
indeed desirable on the grounds that shareholder knowledge of the firms
operations is insufficient for them to make a positive contribution to
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managerial decisions.
The organization of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 develops
a criterion for management to use for assessing which courses of action
are in the interest of the shareholders. This criterion - the maximiza-
tion of the firms current market value - is a necessary criterion if
the 'separation theorem' is to hold.
Chapter 3 describes empirical and theoretical evidence that compen-
sation packages are linked most strongly to the size of the firm as
measured by its sales, suggesting that managements motivation may be
directed more towards increasing the size of the firm then to satisfying
the interest of the shareholders.
Chapter 4 looks at current forms of incentive plans used for manage-
ment and describes reasons for thinking that these plans may actually
encourage management to pursue objectives other than those of the share-
holders.
Chapter 5 goes to modern financial theory to develop a compensation
framework for encouraging management to concentrate their efforts on their
shareholders interests, and develops a rule for practical application of
the framework.
The final Chapter 6 describes empirical work done for this thesis
which shows that executive compensation has historically had little corre-
lation with performance according to the framework developed in the pre-
vious chapter.
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CHAPTER 2: SHOULD MANAGEMENT ACT TO MAXIMIZE THE CURRENT MARKET VALUE OF
THE FIRM?
Modern financial theory is largely based on the assumption that mana-
gers should act to maximize the current market value of their firms. If
managers can be trusted to act in this way then shareholders need play no
part in the running of the firm.
Market value maximization as the sole objective of the firm is based
on the same utilitarian assumptions as the traditional economists'
candidate - miximization of long run profits. Modigliani and Miller1 (MM)
illustrated the drawbacks of the traditional economists' approach:
(1) Under conditions of uncertainty future profits are by defini-
tion unknowable, thus they cannot be candidates for maximiza-
tion in an operational sense.
(2) Probabilistic estimates of "expected" profits are not candidates
for maximization to achieve shareholder objectives because it
is possible to increase expected profit by taking more risk.
Thus managers would need to know their shareholders risk pre-
ferences before going ahead with any investments.
According to MM the maximization of current market value is an opera-
tional criterion (since current market value is known), and the risk pre-
ferences of shareholders can be ignored by managers so long as they always
act to maximize market value, or in other words invest only in projects
where the expected return to the shareholders is at least as high as the
market expects for projects of equivalent risk. If some shareholders
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don't like high risk projects even though they promise sufficiently high
returns they can sell out and buy shares in firms with low risk projects.
MM's argument presupposes that market values are independent of who
owns the firms' shares, and that investors have alternatives which are
equally attractive to them at all times. These assumptions would not be
accepted by everyone, but they seem fair in economies with highly developed
and sophisticated capital markets - "secondary" markets in particular.
It should be noted that although market value maximization is an "opera-
tional" criterion in the sense that current market value is known, any
operational method for achieving the highest market value falls down for
precisely the reason that MM gave in the first argument against using long
run profits as the criterion! Forecasts of equity cash flows are used
in financial theory together with estimates of risk to measure what will
increase current market value. Since the cash flows are not known with
certainty they are not an "operational" criterion, and the rules used for
calculating risk adjusted expectations of the cash flows are compromises
which sacrifice theoretical correctness to become "operational". However
these arguments are mainly semantic. It is true to say that the mar-
ket expects different levels of profitability for different levels of
risk and thus the criterion of maximizing long run profits is not as good
as the criterion of maximizing current market value, assuming efficient
markets.
Both the market value and the profit maximization candidates for the
role of sole objective of the firm assume that what is good for the share-
holders is good for society as a whole. Keynes2 showed that the idea of
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"a divine harmony between private advantage and the public good" dates
back to the early 19th century, although "strains" were evident in Adam
Smith. It was then that the hedonism of Hume was married to the ideas of
equality and social justice of Rousseau, Bentham and Paley. The Econo-
mists showed that "by the working of natural laws individuals pursuing
their own interests with enlightenment in conditions of freedom always
tend to promote the general interest at the same time.... the political
philosopher could retire in favor of the businessman - for the latter
yr"
could attain the philosophers summut bonum by just pursuing his own
private profit." Thus was born the principle of laissez.faire.
Keynes attempted reductio ad absurdum on laissez faire with a parable
about giraffes eating leaves from a tree: "the object of life being to
crop the leaves of the branches up to the greatest possible height, the
likeliest way to achieve this end is to leave the giraffes with the longest
necks to starve out those whose necks are shorter.... thus if only we leave
the giraffes to themselves, (1) the maximum quantity of leaves will be
cropped because the giraffes with the longest necks will, by dint of
starving out the others, get nearest to the trees; (2) each giraffe will
make for the leaves which he finds most succulent amongst those in reach;
and (3) the giraffes whose relish for a given leaf is greatest will crane
over most to reach it. In this way more and juicier leaves will be
swallowed, and each individual leaf will reach the throat that thinks
it deserves it most." A better definition of life's objective for this
parable might have been to "plant enough trees to provide leaves for all
giraffes," although the long necked giraffes would need an incentive to
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work towards this and it is hard to think of one.
Keynes has no monopoly on views on the shortcomings of laissez
faire. Consider Samuelson3 "A rich man's dog may receive the milk that a
poor man's child needs to avoid rickets. Why? Because supply and demand
are working badly? No. Because they are doing what they are designed to
do--putting the goods in the hands of those who can pay the most, who have
the money votes." Very few people today would argue that laissez faire
is the complete answer to all our economic and social ills, although many
markets are no longer competitive, thus the 'invisible hand' is not working.
This has led many to postulate that managers should not have the maximiza-
tion of shareholder wealth as their sole objective; they should become in
some sense corporate trustees for the community with strong codes of ethics
involving responsibility to employees, customers, shareholders and society
as a whole. In other words we need lots of mini Platos.
Anthony4 attempted to formalize these thoughts by proposing that mana-
gers should be aiming for a "satisfactory" return on investment. This re-
turn cannot be defined precisely, but a lower limit is the company's "ex-
pected cost of capital" and the upper limit is related to profit opportuni-
ties within the industry in which the firm operates. According to Anthony-
it does not follow from this that income is distributed according to the
dictates of management. Labor unions, boards of directors, bankers and
the governemnt also interact to ensure that they get their fair share.
But he misses the point. With managerial discretion on what constitutes
a satisfactory return on investment managers may not dictate how income
is to be distributed, but they will dictate within bounds how much income
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is generated. He goes on to say that "a business man is a human being,
and it is completely unrealistic to expect him to exist in an ethical
vacuum." This implies that in Anthony's view serving the interest of the
shareholders has no ethical quality. Many shareholders would no doubt
feel that managers who did not pursue their interests were being downright
unethical!
Not everyone believes that managers should become the moral custodians
of society. Drucker5 believes that "in a society which believes in econo-
mic progress, as has ours for the last two hundred years, the profit motive
is an efficient mechanism of integration, because it relates individual
motives and drives directly to accepted social purpose." Rostow6 says
"if, as widely thought, the essence of corporate statesmanship is to seek
less than maximum profits, postwar experience is eloquent evidence that
such statesmanship leads to serious malfunctioning of the economy as a
whole." In this he is supported by some rather scanty empirical evidence
by Guth, where the growth rate and profitability of the firm is suggested
to be inversely correlated with the "level of commitment of top-level mana-
gers to other than economic values," although there is no implication as
to the direction of cause and effect.
Rostow goes on to say that "the responsibilities of corporate direc-
tors require redefinition. It may give us a warm and comfortable feeling
to say that the director is a trustee for the community, rather than for
his stockholders.... .. It would be more constructive, however, to seek
redefinition in another sense: to restate the laws of corporate trustee-
ship in terms which take full account of the social advances of this century,
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but which direct the directors more sharply to concentrate their historic
economic duties to their stockholders." In other words he is saying that
society, via the medium of elected government, should determine the social
constraints and objectives within which managers should pursue the econo-
mic objectives of their shareholders. Managers are thereby relieved of
the necessity to make value judgements that should be made by society,
which is a very attractive concept--both because it is practical and
because it avoids the paternalism of unelected "corporatism."
The conclusion to all this is that there is nothing wrong with mana-
gers acting solely to increase shareholder wealth, but that society must
define the framework within which this is done, and must decide how the
proceeds are to be distributed via taxation. Society must also define the
rules concerning whether managers should use political influence to pro-
tect - and enhance - shareholder interests vis a vis the rest of society.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how best to encourage managers
to concentrate their economic duties to their shareholders. The maximiza-
tion of current market value will be the yardstick by which their perfor-
mance is measured.
-13-
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CHAPTER 3: THE DETERMINANTS OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
INTRODUCTION
This section first looks at empirical work that has been done to deter-
mine the relationship, if any, between executive compensation and financial
measures of the corporation, There is then a brief description of some of
the various hypotheses about actual practise which have been put forward
to explain these empirical results. Then there is a description of the
remuneration process as seen by some practioners - consultants and managers
who actually set salaries and bonuses. Finally there are concluding comments.
EMPIRICAL STUDIES
1. PATTON
The first postwar study of the determinants of executive compensation
was done by Patton.1 In this study the SEC salary reports for 664 companies
were analysed (together with a detailed salary questionnaire by the Ameri-
can Management Associationfor 1949) for the years 1945, 1948 and 1949.
The companies were split into 22 industry categories and 3 profit catego-
ries: 0-2 million, 2-7 million, 7 million and above. (For the 1949
figures dompanies were split down further into five profit categories).
This study was not based on statistically tested propositions but on the
analysis of averages.
The conclusions that Patton drew from this study were as follows:
a) Executive compensation varies with company profits.
b) Executives must increase profits if they want higher compensation.
c) The fastest growing companies tend to pay more.
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d) Industry profit margins provide no guide to industry salaries.
However those industries with 'creative competitiveness' pay
more than those which are more pedestrian.
e) Profit margins increase with increases in net income.
Patton went on to say that there is a 'reasonably convincing argument
for a company to pay higher executive salaries than does its competition,
and this was supposed to follow from the five points above. There appears
to be a confusion between cause and effect here.
2. ROBERTS
Roberts2 was the first person to base a study on statistical testing
of hypotheses. He also introduced another variable, corporate size in
terms of sales, into the study and analysed the effects of both levels and
changes in corporate size and profitability on executive compensation.
His study was based on the SEC salary reports for 410 companies in 1945,
1948 and 1949 and 939 companies in 1950. Stock options were not included
although bonuses were.
The conclusions that Roberts drew from his study were as follows:
a) The level of executive compensation is related significantly
to corporate size, and the relationship between compensation
and profits is superficial and disappears when the effects of
size are discounted.
Within manufacturing and retail industries the relationship
between industry and compensation disappears when size is dis-
counted, although industries 'where there is public regulation
or close scrutiny' consistently pay less.
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b) Changes in executive compensation vary with profit changes and
size changes, but collinearity removes the significance.
3. McGUIRE, CHIN & -1LBING
McGuire, Chin and Elbing3 used multiple regression to test the effects
of sales and profits on the pay of the chief executive officer of 45 of
the 100 largest corporation in the U.S.A. between 1953 and 1959. Data was
taken from Fortune and Business Week. They tested lag effects through
time as well as testing the effects of changes and levels of their variables.
The conclusions they drew were as follows:
a) Compensation varies directly with sales, and not with profits.
b) Compensation varies with current sales, last years sales, the
year before's sales. Changes in compensation vary with changes
in current years sales, changes in last years sales, but not
consistently with changes in the year before's sales. The level
of significance in each case was near enough that it was impos-
sible to say which relationships were more significant.
4. CISCEL
Ciscel attempted to bring in even more variables to explain executive
compensation. His analysis included sales, assets, net income, number
of employees, previous years sales and previous years assets. He showed
that the correlation for these variables was much higher for all officers
and directors as the dependent variable than for the chief executive alone.
Ciscel concluded that 'growth and size, not profitability were the
prime determinants of corporate financial reward.' However he pointed out
that there was such strong collinearity between the independent variables
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that the identification of any relationship was 'permanently obscured.'
HYPOTHESES TO EXPLAIN WHY SIZE IS THE IMPORTANT DETERMINANT OF COMPEN-
SATION
1. SIMON
H.A. Simon5 produced a theory of executive compensation to explain
why.sales appear to be the key determinant of compensation. The basis
of his theory is as follows:
- Competition in the labor market determines the lowest levels of
executive salary.
- There is a social determination of the steepness (number of levels)
of the organizational hierarchy.
- There is a social determination of the ratio of an executives'
salary to that of his subordinates.
If the number of employees in the firm varies directly with the level
of sales, which is an assumption of the study, then via the above frame-
work executive compensation will vary directly with sales. In Simon's
words 'salaries are determined by requirements of internal 'consistency'
of the salary scale with the formal organization, and by norms of propor-
tionality between the salaries of executives and their subordinates.'
2. BAUMOL
6
W.J. Baumol, as an economist, rejects the traditional economic frame-
work that assumes that firms seek to maximize profits. He says 'I believe
that the typical large corporation in the United States seeks to maximize
not its profits but its total revenues which the business man calls his
sales...once his profits exceed some vaguely defined level.' Baumol is
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one of a number of economists who are trying to bring the sales objective
into economic theory.
3. GALBRAITH
7.
J.K. Galbraith is unequivocal in his belief that sales are the major
goal of modern U.S. management:
"Once the safety of the technostructure is insured by a minimum
level of profits, then there is a measure of choice as to goals. Nothing
is so compelling as the need to survive. However, there is little doubt
as to how, overwhelmingly, this choice is exercised: it is to achieve
the greatest possible rate of corporate growth as measured in sales.
This goal also commends itself strongly to the self interest of the
technostructure. Expansion of output means expansion of the technostruc-
ture itself. Such expansion, in turn, means more jobs with more responsi-
bility and hence more promotion and more compensation... the growth of the
firm serves another important purpose for the technostructure, it is
the best protection against contraction."
Galbraith appears to believe that it is impossible to expect manage-
ment to act in their shareholders interest if there is a separation be-
tween ownership and management. 'One might imagine that a man of vigorous
lusty and reassuringly heterosexual inclination eschews the lovely, avail-
able and even naked women by whom he is intimately surrounded in order to
maximize the opportunities of other men whose existence he knows of only
by hearsay. Such are the foundation of the maximization doctrine when
there is full separation of power from reward.'
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THE PRACTITIONERS VIEW OF THE COMPENSATION PROCESS
The basis for the following discussion of how practitioners see the
compensation process for chief executive and chief operating officers is
the report of a symposium on the subject carried out by Compensation Re-
view.8 The people who took part in this symposium were as follows:
- T.J. Castle, Director of Compensation, American Airlines, Inc.
- B. Ellig, Corporate Director of Compensation and Benefits, Pfizer,Inc.
- K. Foster, Director of Compensation Planning, Towers, Perrin, Forster
and Crosby.
- V.E. Landauer, Principal, Frank B. Manley and Company.
- D. McLaughlin, Principal, McKinsey and Company, Inc.
- J. Reen, Director of Compensation and Benefits, GTE International.
- J.G. Stevens, Consultant, Executive Compensation, General Electric
Company.
- E.C. Miller, Editor, Compensation Review.
The strains of thought picked out from this report are not of course in-
tended to indicate that all those present were in agreement.
1. Procedure of Determination
The most prevalent procedure for determining top officers pay in
large companies is to have a board compensation committee. These
committees use salary surveys, comparisons with other selected com-
panies and general judgement of the adequacy of company performance
and management capability to set salaries. They are however selected
by management, as are external consultants who are called in. They
are not, therefore, truly independent.
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2. Base Salary
Base salary is mainly influenced by size and the industry segment in
which the firm operates. Other factors can include the salary posi-
tion of the individual as he has moved up the organization, age of
the officer, the length of time he will remain in the job, company
performance (although this does not affect base salary downwards very
much), philosophy of the CEO and philosophy of the Compensation Com-
mittee. It is more likely that the CEO would be changed than have
his base salary lowered.
3. Total Compensation
A very high proportion of what is paid at the top can be explained by
the growth in size of the corporation, industry patterns and general
economic trends. In spite of lower profits compensation increases
'in too many instances.' 'The pattern that actuallyexists in far too
many companies, that is, no obvious relationship between performance
and pay, just adds fuel to the fire of anti business attitudes.'
4. Bonus Setting
'The single strongest determinant by far of bonus size is present
salary.' Most firms have a set-aside that is a percentage of stock-
holders equity before the fund is created to determine a minimum per-
formance before incentives will be paid. Some firms specify a maxi-
mum bonus size for individuals as a percentage of salary. Industry
patterns also set norms for bonus size. For example in the insurance
industry bonuses are rarely more than 30-35% of salary, while in
retailing an equivalent figure might be 100%.
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CONCLUSIONS
There seems to be little conflict between the results of empirical
studies and the actual process of setting executive salaries. The fact
that sales appear to be so important in determining executive compensa-
tion gives credence to the views of Galbraith and Simon, and raises
doubts about the motives of management as seen from the shareholder
perspective.
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CHAPTER 4: INCENTIVE PLANS
INTRODUCTION
This dhapter describes current and proposed incentive plans, concen-
trating on their drawbacks in preparation for the next chapter which intro-
duces a suggestion for a new type of plan.
The primary purpose of an incentive plan for top management should
be to encourage them to pursue vigorously the shareholder interest, or -
as was shown in Chapter 2 - to maximize the current market value of the
firm. In Chapter 3 doubts were expressed about the motives of management
in large companies. This makes it doubly important that incentive plans
for management should not make it profitable to pursue managements' in-
terests at the expense of their shareholders.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Incentive plans are
split into two categories: Plans which reward management for performance
according to Book Value measures of performance, and plans which use
Market Value measures of performance. 'Book Value' plans are examined
first.
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CHAPTER 4 SECTION A. BOOK VALUE INCENTIVE PLANS
INTRODUCTION
Book Value incentive plans ('BV plans') usually compensate managers
for performance measured by one or some of the following ratios derived
from the published accounts of the firm:
- Return on Investment or Assets (ROI), usually defined as Net Income
divided by the Net Book Value of all Assets including Working
Capital.
- Return on Equity or Net Worth (ROE), usually defined as Net Income
divided by the Net Book Value of Stockholders Equity.
- Earnings per Share (EPS), usually defined as Net Income divided by
Average Shares Outstanding for the year.
- Residual Income, usually defined as Net Income minus a notional
return on the Book Value of either Net Assets or Stockholders
Equity.
Most plans therefore have some measure of the earnings generated during
the year, Net Income, and some measure of the investment base that has
been used to generate those earnings - Stockholders Equity or Net Assets.
Notable exceptions to this are plans based on EPS, or on growth in
EPS. Such plans provide no measure of how efficiently capital is
being used.
The rationale behind BV plans is that, given the uncertainty of the
market mechanism which places a value on the firms shares, performance
measured by one or other of the above ratios represents true performance
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in increasing the 'underlying value' of the firm.
There are two main problems with all BV plans. The first is a pro-
blem of motivation. BV plans can encourage managers to act against the
interest of the shareholders by enabling them to profit from so doing.
The second is a problem of interpretation. Since BV plans are based on
historical cost information,performance according to the ratios shown
above does not always indicate true performance in the economic sense.
These two problems will now be examined, followed by a description of BV
plans on offer, and concluding comments on BV plans as a whole.
PROBLEMS OF MOTIVATION
Here are some of the reasons for supposing that BV plans may encourage
management to act against the shareholders interest:
(1) Management can manipulate BV plans by using 'creative' accounting
techniques. Some illustrations of this are as follows:
-EPS can be increased by acquiring companies with a lower price-
earnings ratio and issuing shares to pay for them. For example
Firm A has 1000 shares values at $2 each and has earnings of
$100, thus showing EPS of $0.1 - or 10 cents. Firm B has 1000
shares valued at $1 each and also has earnings of $100, and EPS
again are 10 cents. Firm A buys Firm B by issuing 500 new shares
of Firm A to the owners of Firm B. EPS for the new firm are
13.33 cents, representing an improvement of one third in 'per-
formance' as measured by EPS.
-Profits can be shifted to and from unconsolidated subsidiaries
by arbitrary transfer pricing mechanisms.
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-Stockholders equity is a balancing item and is therefore
affected by manipulation of profits and assets. It can also
be manipulated directly by for example declaring ' special
dividends' to unconsolidated subsidiaries.
It may appear that such practises would be curtailed by the re-
quirements of consistency and fairness embodied in the Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles, but there are plenty of examples of such practises
happening. One vivid example of accounting manipulations is shown in
Charles Raws' book on Slater Walker.1
(2) Senior Managers are often near retirement age. If they are on
a BV plan they will have a strong incentive to reject good long term
projects in favor of anything that has a current impact of Book
Value figures. This will be particularly true when managers have
pension plans based on their last few years earnings. Any increase
in incentive pay at this time could affect their pension earnings
for the rest of their lives.
(3) If the firm operates in a cyclical industry, profits and BV
plan payouts may fluctuate with successive booms and slumps. Fluc-
tuating pay packets are unsettling for managers, and in a graduated
tax system may result in lower after tax earnings. This will give
management an incentive to diversify their operations whether or
not such diversification is in the interest of the shareholders.
Shareholders can, after all, diversify their shareholdings without
paying someone else to do it for them.
(4) BV plans will encourage management to invest in any project which
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will have a favorable effect on Book Value performance, even if the
shareholders could use the money more profitably for the same risk
elsewhere.
PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION
As mentioned previously most BV plans use Net Income as a measure
of earnings and Net Assets or Stockholders Equity as a measure of the
investment base. Assuming that Net Assets are defined to include working
capital the only difference between Net Assets and Stockholders Equity
is the Book Value of Long Term Debt. To illustrate the problems of inter-
preting Book Value figures it will be assumed that it is only necessary
to describe problems with Net Income as a measure of earnings, problems
with Net Assets as a measure of investment, and the compounded problems
which ensue when Net Income is divided by Net Assets to get an accounting
rate of return. The illustration of these problems will show the kinds
of interpretation difficulty which apply to all Book Value measurements.
A short discussion of the impact of inflation accounting proposals is also
included.
Problems with Net Income as a Measure of Earnings
Net Income as reported provides no measure of increased growth oppor-
tunities generated during the year. An adaptation of Hicks' definition
of personal income might say that earnings for the firm should show the
amount of money that could be distributed to the shareholders while leaving
the firm in a position no better or worse than at the beginning of the
year. Net Income does not show such earnings, and this is the main problem.
However there are significant accounting problems with Net Income which
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also affect its
-All other
usefulness as a measure of earnings:
things being equal different depreciation rules will show
different patterns of profit over time. Straight line depreciation
will show a steady flow of profits, while accelerated depreciation
will show increasing profits over time. For example assume Company
A has one five year asset costing $1000, which generates $500 per
annum in cash for each of the five years. (In this example cash
flow minus depreciation equals profit):
YEAR CASH FLOW DEPRECIATION PROFIT
SL SYD DDB SL SYD DDB
1 500 200 333.3 400 300 166.7 100
2 500 200 266.7 240 300 233.3 260
3 500 200 200.0 144 300 300 356
4 500 200 133.3 86.4 300 366.7 413.6
5 500 200 66.7 129.6 300 433.3 370.4
TOTAL 2500 1000 1000 1000 1500 1500
SL = Straight Line. SYD = Sum-of-the-years-digits. DDB = Double
declining balance.
-All other things being equal different capitalization policies will
substantially affect the time flow of profits (Net Income). A growing
firm will always show higher profits if Research and Development or
Oil Exploration costs are capitalized than if they are expensed.
-Price increases will impact profits more quickly if LIFOvaluation
of inventory is used, than if FIFO or average costing are used.
-Under inflation Net Income will usually grow faster in money terms
than in real terms, (although taxation usually increases also). If
taxation rates remain the same in money terms then more tax may be
paid by the corporation each year even if the earnings remain the
1500
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same.
-Depreciation can be regarded as the amount of money a firm should
deduct from earnings to show what is required to maintain the capital
stock in real terms. If this is accepted then Net Income will again
be overstated in an inflationary era, since depreciation does not
show the extramoney cost of replacing worn out assets, provided
there are no technological advances in the production of the replace-
ment assets. (This will not apply with fixed assets such as land.)
-Inflation will affect the value of items such as long term debt and
land in a way that will not be reflected in profits until these items
are realized.
Problems with BV Net Assets as a Measure of Investment
The same problems that can be seen with the use of Net Income as a
measure of earnings can be observed with the use of Net Assets as a measure
of investment. The Book Value of Net Assets is affected by accounting
rules and by inflation, and is at present based solely on historical costs.
However the sum of reported profits accruing to an investment is unaffected
in total by accounting rules, although the value of those profits in today's
money will of course be affected by when the profits appear in time. The
sum of reported Net Asset Values over time is affected by accounting rules.
Examples of the accounting problems which affect Net Assets are as follows:
-Different depreciation methods will give different total amounts of
Net Assets reported on the balance sheet over the life of each pro-
ject, depending on the degree of acceleration of the method of depre-
ciation chosen. For example assume that Company A has one asset which
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cost $1000 and is depreciated to zero over five years using the three
common forms of depreciation - straight line (SL), sum-of-the-years-
digits (SYD) and double declining balance. The following table shows
the substantial difference in Net Book Value of the Asset shown over
its lifetime.
YEAR DEPRECIATION NET BV OF ASSET
SL SYD DDB SL SYD DDB
0 1000 1000 1000
1 200 333.3 400 800 666.6 600
2 200 266.7 240 600 400 360
3 200 200 144 400 200 216
4 200 133.3 86.4 200 66.7 129.6
5 200 66.7 129.6 0 0 0
Sum of reported BV over life: 3000 2333.3 2305.6
-Different methods of capitalization will also affect Net Book Value
of Assets - not only over time, but also in the absolute amount of
Net Book Value reported over the Asset life. The greater is the
fraction of an investment that is expensed, the lower will be the
sum of the Book Values of Net Assets reported.
-Different methods of valuing inventory will also affect Net Book
Value of Assets. A price increase in raw material for example will
increase the value of inventory for a longer period of time under
FIFO inventory valuation than under LIFO and this effect could last
for ever if the firm never runs its inventory down below a certain
point.
-Under inflation Assets measured in money terms will be shown at less
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than the cost of replacing them, assuming replacement technology
is unchanged.
-The gap between current value, as measured by Replacement Cost, and
Historic cost will tend to increase with the age of the Asset under
inflation.
All these effects of accounting rules and inflation are compounded when
Net Income is divided by Net Book Value of Assets to form an Accounting
Rate of Return.
The Biases in Accounting Rates of Return
The biases in accounting rates of return are complicated by all the
interactions of the biases in net income as a measure of earnings and net
Book Value of Assets as a measure of investment. ROI (defined above) pur-
ports to measure the true economic rate of return to an investment, al-
though it does not take into account the time value c- money and values
all cash flows equally whenever they appear.
Solomon and Laya2 used a simple model to measure the quantitative
distortion of ROI as a measure of true economic return. Here are some of
their findings:
Assume a zero growth firm, with no inflation or taxation. The firm
invests $1000 per annum in identical projects which yield a true economic
rate of return of 10% per annum each year for six years in the form of a
level payment of $229.61 per annum.
-Using straight line depreciation the accounting ROI stabilizes at
10.79% compared with the true yield of 10%. (This is due to the
difference between economic depreciation, where the assets depre-
ciate to reflect the present value of future cash flows remaining,
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and straight line depreciation.
-Again using straight line depreciation Book ROI increases with the
percentage of the cost of an investment which is expensed. Typical
results are as follows:
-For the same level of true return Book ROI varies directly with the
length of any lag between investment outlay and cash inflows. Book
ROI also varies directly with the length of the investment outlay
period, and if cash inflows increase over time (for example with
inflation) this will also increase the Book ROI over the true return.
-Any growth in the firm, or inflation, will often cause complicated
divergences of Book ROI from true return.
There are thus significant problems with using Book Value measures
of performance as a measure of true management performance which will
complicate all Book Value based incentive plans.
There are those who believe that inflation accounting could act as
the cure all to the problems that have been discussed.
The Impact of Inflation Accounting on the Problems with ROI, Net Income
and the Net Book Value of Assets
The four main inflation accounting models uner consideration are as
follows: (source: Fabricant3 ).
-The FASB 1974 proposal for expressing assets and liabilities in terms
% OF INVESTMENT COST EXPENSED BOOK ROI%
50 21.58
20 13.49
0 10.79
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of dollars of constant purchasing power.
-The SEC 1975 proposal for valuing inventories, cost of goods sold
and plant and equipment at current replacement costs.
-The Australian proposal for valuing assets at 'exit prices' - which
are the prices for which the assets could be sold, less selling costs.
-Four models being tested by the AICPA, which are mainly variations
of the FASB and SEC proposals.
In addition there are countless other views held by academics and practi-
tioners around the world. Two of particular interest are:
4
-Anthony's view. Anthony assumes that in practise many firms set their
prices to cover historic costs.- He thus concludes that historic
costing accurately measures the performance of a firm towards its
objectives, which are to get a certain return on historic costs.
This argument assumes that firms have a market for their products
at historic cost plus the cost of capital and that the time value
of money is not important. Anthony would thus leave things as they
are.
5
-Vancil's view. Vancil has suggested 'specific and general price
level accounting' which basically measures profit after depreciation
sufficient to maintain the real capital sotck, in units of constant
dollars. It is thus an amalgamation of the FASB and SEC proposals.
What would these inflation accounting schemes do for the problems with
Book Value figures notes above? None of them will attack the problems
caused by different expensing, depreciation policies when comparing one
firm with another. Some form of Vancil type proposal probably comes
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nearest to eliminating many of the other problems. No Book Value measure-
ment, however, will ever be able to show how good performance has been
compared with what the market expects.
A DESCRIPTION OF BV PLANS 'PROPOSED OR AVAILABLE
The incentive plans which will be examined are as follows: (Sources 6
- Traditional profit sharing plans.
- Wulfsberg's adjusted profit sharing plan
- Performance shares
- Participating, or performance, units.
- Book Value stock plans.
- Profit related stock options.
All these plans are based on Book Value performance indicators, and thus
suffer from some or all of the objections to Book Value measurements dis-
cussed above.
Traditional Profit Sharing Plans
Profit sharing plans are based on the assumption that employees should
participate with shareholders in any return the firm generates in the
year over and above a fair return to shareholders for the use of their
funds. The fair return to shareholders is often defined as some low
notional rate of interest (the risk free rate?) applied to the Book Value
of stock holders equity. Of course shareholders may have paid many times
Book Value for their investments, and they may well expect a higher return
than this notional return for taking the risk of investing in the firm
rather than in treasury bills.
An example profit sharing plan would set a percentage of Net Income
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that could be distributed to employees, say 10%, after deducting from Net
Income a figure of say 5% of stockholders equity. The resulting available
pool would then be distributed to key employees according to their predeter-
mined share of the pool. The share that key employees have would often
be determined by their base salary level.
Apart from not necessarily being fair to shareholders this type of
profit sharing plan encourages short term decision making in that it
encourages managers to go for profits today at the expense of longer term
opportunities.
Wulfsberg's 'Growth Oriented Incentive Compensation System'
This is basically a traditional profit sharing plan but, in order to
reduce the emphasis on current earnings that such plans encourage, the
payment to the employee in a particular year is based on the estimated
ratio of the effect of his current efforts on all future years earnings
divided by the effect of his current efforts on current years earnings.
This ratio is called the 'K ratio'. Based on his salary each employee is
awarded a share of the total profit sharing fund each year. For example
he might get 0.1% of the fund for every $1000 of base salary that he
earns, (although theallocation to new employees would have to be reduced
periodically to ensure that more than 100% of the pool is never allocated).
Assume that the employees K ratio is one, which means that half his
efforts impact future years earnings and half impact the current year.
Under Wulfsberg's system instead of being paid.1% of this years fund for
each $1000 of salary he would get .05% of this years fund, .025% of next
years fund, .0125% of the following years fund and so on. There would
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need to be an adjustment to round up the sum of all percentages to 0.1%
after a certain period of time - say five years.
Since the employee would after five years be getting 0.1% of each
years fund by definition, then after five years Wulfsberg's system is the
same as a traditional profit sharing plan except that the manager always
knows that he has the right to a share of the next five years profit
sharing pool even if he leaves or retires.
The time pattern of the employees payments for the first few years
is shown in the following table for each $1000 dollars of his base salary
% of fund paid in year per $1000 salary
%
earned
in year
per
$1000
salary
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
When the manager leaves or retires he will get .5% of the next years fund,
.25% of the follwing years fund and so on.
This is quite a complicated system and a similar result could be
achieved with more simplicity by waiting before putting an employee into
the profit sharing scheme and then allowing him to remain in it for a
few years after he leaves or retires, although Wulfsberg's system does
try to match the method of payment to the long term emphasis of the mana-
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
.05 .025 .0125 .00625 .00625 0 0
.05 .025 .0125 .00625 .00625 0
.05 .025 .0125 .00625 .00625
.05 .025 .0125 .00625
.05 .025 .0125
.05 .025
.05
.05 .075 .0875 .09375 .1 .1 .1
:
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ger's job. The only time Wulfsberg's system really differs from a tradi-
tional profit sharing scheme is at the beginning of the managers career
and when he is comtemplating leaving or retiring. It does not of course
address any of the other problems with profit sharing plans.
Performance Shares
Performance shares became popular around the early 1970's and were hailed
by some as 'revitalizing executive stock plans'.
The idea behind performance shares is that key executives can earn
shares in the company by meeting a target defined in book value terms
within a specified period of time. The time period is usually linked to
the time taken in the company for decisions to impact net income and
the target is based on something like cumulative growth in earnings per
share. If performance meets target then participants in the scheme are
paid their specified number of shares, or they are sometimes paid half
in cash and half in shares. Often employees forfeit their right to their
shares if they leave before they have been awarded, thus managers contem-
plating leaving have little incentive to fulfil the target requirements.
There is also often a maximum limit on the value of the shares awarded
not exceeding 100% of salary after four years or 150% after six years.
Performance share plans do not at present require stockholder
approval, although many firms still seek such approval. However the per-
formance goals are often not stated, or if they are they are broad goals
such as x% cumulative growth in EPS. As noted before EPS provide no
measure of how efficiently capital is being used within the organization.
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Participating or performance units
Participating units are like performance shares, except that payment
is made in cash and may be based on a 'incremental value only' or on a
'initial value plus' relative to the price of the firms shares when the
units are issued. The performance criteria are usually set in the same
way as for performance shares.
Book Value Stock plans
Book Value Stock plans have become popular in recent years when the
stock market has been declining. They have been introduced by firms such
as Citicorp, Corning Glass and Johnson & Johnson. According t- Cook, Book
Value Stock 'enables employees to be rewarded over their entire careers
in direct proportion to the results they achieve for their companies stock-
holders as measured by growth in the underlying value of the stock'.
Book Value Stock plans are based on the Book Value of stockholders
Equity per common share. Plans can allow employees to purchase Book Value
shares with fulldividend and voting rights (e.g. Corning Glass); plans
can allow employees to buy options on Book Value Shares (e.g. Citicorp);
plans can provide Book Value Stock units, which are 'notional' shares
which pay dividends and sometimes pay full value after a few years.
It should be noted with Book Value Share schemes that unless the
firm makes losses Book Value Shares will always increase in value irrespec-
tive of whether performance is terrible in terms of profitability or return
to shareholders.
Profit Related Stock Options
Profit related stock options are an idea from Nwokobia of Allied
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Chemical Corporation. The idea is to offer ordinary shares to executives
with a guaranteed resale price provision. The resale price is called the
'earned net value' and is equal to the option price plus some percentage
of the company's cumulative EPS during the life of the option. If the
market price of the shares is high the executive can sell his stock on
the open market. If the market price is low the plan behaves just like
a Book Value Stock option plan. Nwokobia says "Shareholder objections to
the approach advocated here seem improbable because dividends also depend
on corporate profitability and not on the stock market." In fact share-
holder approach towards this approach could legitimately be extremely
hostile. The management is saying that they will accept the market
evaluation of their performance if it gives them more money than their
own Book Value Evaluation, but that if the market evaluates theirperfor-
mance in a lower way because for example management has been running down
the business for short term profit impact they will elect to be paid on
a Book Value basis. This example of 'having your cake and eating it'
is illustrated again in the proposal for a new five year performance
unit-stock option plan at General Electric. Their management wishes to
have a stock option plan (these will be described later) and a performance
unit plan, with executives being paid whichever offers the highest reward.
In addition to this the management of G.E. already has a profit sharing
plan which pays out up to 10% of Net Income each year.
CONCLUSION ON BOOK VALUE PLANS
The first parts of this sectionon Book Value incentive plans pointed
out the incentives Book Value measurements could give management to act
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against the interests of their shareholders, and the serous methodolo-
gical problems involved in using Book Value measures as a measurement of
performance. A brief description of current Book Value incentive plans
revealed no way of getting around these problems. The conclusion of this
section is that BV plans leave a lot to be desired.
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CHAPTER 4: SECTION B MARKET VALUE INCENTIVE PLANS
INTRODUCTION
Market value incentive plans ('MV plans') are plans which use the
performance of the firm as measured by the capital markets as a basis for
the incentive compensation of management. The rationale for such systems
is that if managements compensation is linked to the shareholders objec-
tive, the maximization of current market value, then there will be some
congruence of interest.
There are three main problems with MV plans:
- In valuing the firm the market takes into account many external
factors which are beyond the control of management and which affect
all investments. Some of these factors are not factors for which
management can reasonably be held responsible, although they are
responsible for managing the firms policies in relation to these
factors.
- The market for shares is very volatile, with a standard deviation
from year to year of more than forty percent for the market as a
whole. Shareholders are essentially gamblers who take risks in
return for higher expectations of return. Managers on the other
hand are not gamblers in the same sense, although they are of
course expected to take risks. They are not necessarily expected
to take the same risks with their incentive compensation as share-
holders take with their investment, since shareholders can diversify
away a considerable portion of their risk while management cannot
diversify their jobs.
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- MV plans can give management a lot of money when the market as a
whole does well even when management has performed poorly. Like-
wise if the market is in recession even a super successful manage-
ment may fail to get rewarded. There is thus no necessary link
between pay and performance, except that when the shareholders do
well management does well and when the shareholders do badly so does
management. There is no guarantee that the shareholders get value
for money from their investment in these incentive schemes, and
management has no guarantee of being treated fairly.
A DESCRIPTION OF MV PLANS PROPOSED OR AVAILABLE
The incentive plans which will be examined are as follows: (sources 6
Stock options - Qualified plans
Non qualified plans
Tandem plans
Employee stock purchase plans
Stock units - Appreciation right plans
Phantom stoek plans.
Stock Options
A stock option is a piece of paper which entitles its owner to buy
a share of a certain stock at a defined price within a specified period
of time. The value of a stock option lies in the hope that some time
during the specified period the stock will be traded at a price higher
than the option 'exercise' price so that the owner of the option can buy
the share at below market value and either 'hold' the share or sell it
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for an immediate profit. The value of a stock option will increase with
the length of time of the specified period and the volatility of the
underlying stock, as well as being inversely proportional to the exercise
price. Executive Compensation figures reported by publicly traded firms
do not usually include a value for stock options granted, since they
are generally regarded as unvaluable. However it is possible to value
stock options using the Black-Scholes model developed at MIT, which pro-
duces values of traded options very close to the prices at which they are
actually traded and which can be used for valuing untraded options.
Stock options are very popular with management during buoyant market
conditions because it is not necessary to pay out any money until a gain
has already been made if options are granted for nothing.
- Qualified Stock Options
Qualified stock option plans are plans which qualify for capital
gains tax treatment on the gain between the option price and the gain
realized on exercising the option. Under the Tax Reform Act of 1976 no
new qualified stock option plans may be started, and options outstanding
from previous plans must expire or be exercised by May 21, 1981.
There were certain restrictions imposed before a qualifed plan
could be classed as qualified. Plans required stockholder approval; no
employee could hold more than 5% of the voting power of the stock and
be eligible for options; options had to be issued at 100% of fair market
value, and their life was restricted to five years or less; shares which
were bought by exercising options had to be held for three years or more;
options had to be exercised in the same order as they were issued.
Qualified stock options were expensive for the firm, and therefore
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for the shareholders since no part of the gain to the executive was deduc-
tible to the firm as an expense. Thus on a qualified stock option gain
of $20 the executive in a 50% tax bracket saved $3 by being taxed at the
lower capital gains tax rate of 35%. However the firm lost $10 of tax
shield that would have been gained had the option failed to qualify and
the gain counted as income.
- Non Qualified Stock Options
Any gain resulting from holding nonqualified stock options is taxed
as income to the executive. However non qualified stock options suffer
from none of the restictions on qualified stock options except that their
issue requires stockholders approval, and their diluting effect on earn-
ings per share must be shown on the Balance Sheet as if they had all been
exercised.
Non qualified options can be granted at any price, but if their
value at the time of grant is 'readily ascertainable' then income tax at
the appropriate rate is payable at that time on the difference between
grant price and readily ascertainable value. Congress has directed the
IRS to develop regulations for the valuation of non qualified options at
the time of grant.
- 'Tandem' Plans
Tandem plans were simply mixtures between qualified and non qualified
options.
- Employee Stock Purchase Plans
Employees can benefit from favorable tax treatment by purchasing
options subject to the following restrictions. Options must be offered
to all employees except those holding more than 5% of the outstanding
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stock, although no employee may receive more than $25,000 per year in
value of the stock. The grant price may be 85% of the lower of fair
market value at time of grant or at time of exercise, and there are
no restrictions on which options may be exercised first. The options
must be held for two years minimum from the date of grant, including
six months from the date of exercise. Ordinary income tax is due on
the discount from 100% of fair market value at the time of grant when
the stock is sold (or if less, on the excess of proceeds over option
price) and the remaining gain is regarded as a capital gain.
Stock 'lntt Plans
Stock unit plans do not involve the issue of real shares. Employees
are given cash or shares at the end of a period based on the gain they
would have made if they had owned shares, or on the total value they
would have if they had owned shares. No stockholder approval is required
for such plans, and there is no diluting effect on earnings per share on
the balance sheet. Full income tax is paid on any payment to employees.
- Stock Appreciation Rights
Appreciation rights entitle employees to a payment determined by
the stock price increase in the firms shares. Appreciation rights are
sometimes granted with options which means that the company will pay
employees not to exercise their options, thus saving the employee the
necessity of raising the money to exercise his option.
- Phantom Stock Plans
Phantom stock plans entitle employees to the total value of a number
of shares that they would have owned had they been given to them at a
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certain time. Again such plans involve no outlay by the employee.
CONCLUSION ON MARKET VALUE PLANS
Market value plans do have the advantage of linking the fortunes
of management with thoseof their shareholders. However the problems
,mentioned in the introduction are serious, and none of the plans described
overcomes them. Many of the plans described appear to have been construc-
ted more with the tax laws in mind than to induce motivation, but to quote
Keynes ' the only intellectual pursuit that carries any reward is the
avoidance of taxation.'
The conclusion of this section, as with the section on Book Value
plans, is that market value plans also leave a lot to be desired.
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CHAPTER 5: A PROPOSED METHOD FOR INCENTIVE CONPENSATION
INTRODUCTION
So far it has been shown that managerial compensation bears little
relationship in practise to anything other than the size of the firm. It
has also been shown that existing incentive plans which purport to link
compensation to performance leave much to be desired, whether they are
based on market value or book value performance.
It is now time to develop a plan which will overcome the obstacles
within existing plans, and which will link managements compensation to the
achievement of shareholders' objectives.
PROPOSED PLAN
Shareholders invest in a firm because they think they can get at
least as good a return in terms of dividends and capital gains from
holding the firms shares as from holding any other investment posessing
the same degree of risk. However shareholders can diversify away much
of the risk associated with holding the firms shares, although with any
risky investment there is always an irreducible element of non diversifi-
able risk which affects them all. If a shareholder invests his money in
all available risky shares in proportion to their market values the only
risk he will bear will be the risk of the market as a whole. Such an
investment strategy can be approximated by investing in an 'index fund',
such as for example a fund which is based on market value weighted
holdings of the Standard and Poors '500' index. In the modern theory of
capital markets it is assumed that shareholders will not expect to be
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rewarded for taking any more risk than the irreducible, non diversifiable
element associated with each firms shares, which is measured by the amount
of movement in the firms share price that can be expected to result from
a movement in the price of a 'market portfolio' constructed from all risky
shares. In other words this risk, or 'Beta', measures the effect that
could be expected on the price of a firms shares from, say, a 10% drop or
rise in the Standard and Poors '500' index. The firms Beta is calculated
from the past covariance between movements in its share price and movements
in the market index. Figures for this 'Beta' are published by institu-
tions such as Merril Lynch, Pierce Fenner and Smith, and Value Line.
Sharpes 'Capital Asset pricing model' can be used to predict the
return that shareholders expect from investing in a firm in terms of
dividends and capital gains. This requires a knowledge of the rate of
interest shareholders can get for no risk, for example the rate being
offered on treasury bills, the beta of the firms shares and the expected
return above the riskless rate that investors expect for investing in the
market portfolio. The model says that the return expected by the investor
is equal to the risk free rate of interest, plus the expected return on
the market portfolio multiplied by the beta of the stock. This model is
not perfect at predicting the differential returns that the market expects
for investments of differing risks, but it is simple and is a good
approximation to what actually happens in the market.
This model could be used to predict what the firms market value
should be at the end of the year, given the riskfree rate of interest for
the past year, the performance of the market as a whole for the year and
the beta of the firms shares. If this 'predicted market value' were to
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be compared with the actual market value of the firm at the end of the
year, shareholders could evaluate the performance of the firm relative
to the market as a whole and adjusted for the risk of the firm.
It could be argued that the market value of the firms shares at the
end of the.year reflects the shareholders' view of the next year, and that
market value is thus too fickle a measure to use for evaluating the
firms performance. However shareholders views about the following year
are also embodied in the return on the market portfolio for the year which
was used as an input to derive the 'predicted market value', thus the
comparison between actual and predicted market value is still valid.
The beta of the firm is affected by changes in the firms financial
leverage, and by changes in the nature of the firms business over the year
and in theory these should be adjusted for. In practice it is relatively
easy to adjust for financial leverage, and unless there are major acquisi-
tions or divestitures during the year the adjustments for changes in the
nature of the firms business can probably be ignored.
The only factor that should make predicted market value differ from
actual market value at the end of the year would be if the present value
of the future earnings of the firm as perceived by shareholders was lower,
relative to the market and adjusted for risk, than shareholders could
reasonably expect. This does not appear to be an unreasonable measure
with which to evaluate and compensate the firms management.
The calculations involved in this method are described in terms of
notation at the end of this chapter.
The advantages of this system would be as follows:
- Accounting biases would be removed from performance measurement.
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- There would be no incentive to go for current profit against future
growth.
- There would be no incentive to diversify unless it was in the share-
holders interest.
- There would be a disincentive to investing in projects with lower
returns than shareholders could get elsewhere for the same risk.
- Managers would be evaluated on their performance relative to the
market as a whole, and thus they could do well even in bad markets,
and badly even in good markets.
- Managers would not be expected to bear the risks of the market as
a whole in their incentive compensation.
- Shareholders would not have to pay out for incentive plans unless
they were getting at least a fair return.
- Managers would find it hard to manipulate the market as a whole in
order to get paid more, but even if they succeeded it would benefit
their shareholders!
This is not to deny that the system has drawbacks. The main disadvantages
to the system are as follows:
- Many managers would be unwilling to submit to the impersonal evalua-
tion of the marketplace. Some might complain that they would be
bearing the full impact of the nonsystematic risk which shareholders
can diversify. However managers are paid to manage nonsystematic
risk, and its impact can work both ways. Also no one is suggesting
that managers should have to pay shareholders when they do badly.
- Many managers might complain that the market for their shares is not
efficient, and that therefore the capital asset pricing model does
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not hold. Most of the empirical evidence would suggest that they
would be wrong, but even if they were right it would give them an
incentive to make the market more efficient by feeding it sufficient
information.
- It is difficult in practice to get meaningful figures for the syste-
matic risk of individual firms, although industry figures could be
used as a proxy.
- Some firms would not wish to divulge information about future growth
prospects for reasons of commercial secrecy. However managers have
an obligation to give shareholders enough information to value their
shares fairly.
- The plan as a whole is too theoretical.
Although the type of incentive plan suggested above is put forward as the
best plan it would be possible to compromise some of the theoretical
correctness to produce more simplistic approaches. One such approach
would be to say that incentive compensation should be related to the per-
formance of the firm in terms of dividends and capital gains relative to
the performance of other firms in the same industry. This might have a
more intuitive appeal, and would retain many of the advantages of the
capital asset pricing model approach. Adjustments would still need to be
made for differences in financial leverage.
SUMMARY OF PRACTICAL RULES FOR APPLICATION
The proposed plan suggests that managements performance can best be
evaluated for compensation using the following procedure:
1. Look up the beta of the firms ordinary shares. Adjust for lever-
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age changes, acquisitions and divestitures.
2. Find the riskless lending rate which has been in operation for
the past year.
3. Find the total return on holding the market portfolio for the
last year.
4. Use the capital asset pricing model to calculate the predicted
market value of the firms shares at the end of the year.
5. Compare the predicted market value with the actual market value
at the end of the year. Devise a formula for sharing any excess
of actual market value over predicted market value between share-
holders and management.
Alternatively if this procedure is too theoretical, sacrifice some theore-
tical correctness and use the following simpler rules:
1. Choose a selection of firms operating in the same industry
operating with the same financial structure.
2. Calculate the return a shareholder would have received if he
had invested in a portfolio of these firms plus the firm being
evaluated, weighted according to the market values of all the
firms at the beginning of the year. The more firms that can
be chosen for comparison the better so long as their business
is similar and their financial structure is the same.
3. Compare the return shareholders in the firm in question received
(in terms of capital gains and dividends) with the return on
the portfolio constructed above. If the return is higher for
the firm multiply the excess return by the market value of the
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firm at the beginning of the year and split the resulting sum
between shareholders and management.
ATTACHMENT
Proposed method of evaluation and compensation described in notation.
Symbols
z =
Z =
Zm
D =
iD=
Expected return on shares of firm J for the year.
Expected return on market portfolio for the year.
Actual return on market portfolio for the year.
Cash paid by firm J to shareholders during year.
One year lending rate on riskless securities at beginning
of year.
( = Systematic or market risk of firm J's equity.
MVt = Market value of firm J equity at beginning of year t.
E(MV)t = Expected MVt
P(MV) = 'Predicted' MV as described in the paper.
t t
Description
Z x MVt = E(MV)t+ + D - MVt = [i + (Z - i)]MVt
E(MV)t+1 = MV t[i + 
-(Zm - i) + MVt D
P(MV)t+ = MV t[i + (Zm - i)] + MVt - D
Remuneration and evaluation would be based on the following, after adjust-
ing for any change in S during the year:
MVt+l 
-P(MV)+
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CHAPTER 6: EMPIRICAL STUDY
INTRODUCTION
The empirical studies discussed in Chapter 3 to find the determinants
of Executive Compensation concentrated on Book Value concepts such as
sales, profits and assets, as well as such variables as number of employ-
ees, to explain different levels of compensation. This section describes
empirical work done for this thesis to attempt to relate executive compen-
sation to variables of primary interest to the stockholders, along with
sales which are known to be a significant factor. The variables, apart
from sales, used in this study are all variations of the following market
value concepts:
- The Market Value of the firms ordinary shares.
- The return to investors, in dividends and capital gains, from the
firms stock.
- The return to investors above or below the Predicted Market Value
described in the last chapter, as a measure of how well the firm
has performed.
The study comprises a number of ordinary least squares regression analyses
of the linear relationship between executive compensation, as defined by
the pay of the Chief Executive Officer, and sales and the above market
value variables. The data for the study was extracted from the published
results of the top fifty companies in the 1977 Fortune 500 as displayed
in various publications, plus other data relative to the performance of
the capital markets between the years 1972-1976. The following appendices
are included in this study to describe in more detail the data, calculations
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and results of the regression runs:
Appendix A List of Companies included in the study.
B Data sources, variable calculation, variable names
and units.
C Results of the regressions.
D Correlation matrices of the independent variables.
This Chapter will outline the methodology behind the study, the results,
the conclusions that can be drawn from the results, and the drawbacks
of the study.
METHODOLOGY
Using figures for each company for each year simple and multiple
regression analysis was performed to test whether the following relation-
ships were significant:
RELATIONSHIPS
Between AND
Chief Executive Officers pay. - Dollar sales of the firm.
- Market value of the firms shares.
- Dividend + capital gain dollar
return to all stockholders.
- Dividend + capital gain percent
return to all stockholders.
- Dividend + capital gain dollar
return above 'predicted market
value' (see last section) to all
stockholders.
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- Dividend + capital gain percent
return above 'predicted Market
Value' to all stockholders.
Dollar sales were much more significant and explained much more of the
variations in pay than any of the other variables and so the next step
was to determine the effect of each of the above variables along with
sales on the chief executive officers pay. This was then repeated using
the pay of the Chief Executive Officer next year as the variable to be
explained, and was repeated again for the pay of the Chief Executive
Officer the year after that. Changes in the Chief Executive Officers pay
were then related to changes in all the above variables (except Market
Value, since change in market value is the same as Dividend plus Capital
Gain return except for dividends, which are a policy variable). Finally
changes in the Chief Executives pay next year were related to changes in
the above variables this year. The change in sales was included in every
run involving changes in Chief Executive Officers pay, along with each of
the other variables taken one at a time. A constant term was used in
every regression. There was thus a total of twenty nine regression runs,
which are shown in more detail in Appendix C. Since five years of data
wereused the runs involving forward lags or changes used fewer obser-
vations.
RESULTS
1) Current sales were significantly correlated with current pay of
the CEO, and explained about 36% of the variations in pay.
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2) Current sales were significantly correlated with next years
pay of the CEO, and explained about 25% of the variations in
next years pay.
3) Current sales were significantly correlated with the year
after next CEO pay, and explained about 21% of the variations.
4) Current market value were significantly correlated with this
years CEO pay, explaining about 11% of the variations, but
this effect became insignificant when sales were also included
since sales and market value are highly collinear (collinearity
between the two is about 48%).
5) None of the other variables were significantly correlated with
the Chief Executive Officers pay by themselves, although the
dollar return to investors above the 'predicted' return appeared
to be negatively correlated with pay when sales were also
included. Since the effect of the percentage return to
investors above the 'predicted' return was not significant
when sales were included this could be some obscure collinearity
effect.
6) Both the dollar return to investors and the percentage return
to investors for investing in the firm for the year were signi-
ficantly correlated with the next years pay of the CEO when
sales were included.
7) Changes in the current years pay of the CEO were always signi-
ficantly correlated with changes in current years sales, and
the only other variable that was significantly correlated with
changes in pay was the percentage return to investors for the
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year.
8) Changes in current sales were not always significantly corre-
lated with changes in the next years pay of the CEO, and the
sign of the coefficient was always negative. This years per-
centage and dollar return to investors and this year dollar
return above predicted all seemed to have significant correla-
tions with changes in next years pay. These results were
obtained using only 141 observations, and the correlation
coefficients were never above 13%. Nevertheless they seem odd
and may be worthy of further investigation.
CONCLUSIONS
1) Of the variables tested only sales consistently showed a signi-
ficant correlation with the current years pay of the CEO. The
dollar return above 'predicted' (ALPHA) appeared to be nega-
tively correlated with pay. If this effect is not due to some
obscure collinearity effect it would suggest that Chief Execu-
tive Officers have little incentive to act in their share-
holders interest and attempt to get a return above the share-
holders opportunity cost of investing in the firm. However
since the percentage return above predicted (CAPM) was not
significant the safest conclusion to draw is that there is no
evidence that performance in the shareholders interest has a
significant effect on pay.
2) There is evidence that the total return to shareholders, in
both percentage and dollar terms, has a significant correlation
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with the qextyears pay of the CEO. There is also evidence
that the dollar return to shareholders has a significant
correlation with the change in the CEO's current pay.
3) The effects of the variables tested on the change in next
years pay of the CEO appear counterintuitive and explain
little of the variations in the change in next years pay.
It is probably unsafe to draw conclusions here.
DRAWBACKS OF THE STUDY
1) Stock options were not included as part of the CEO's pay.
2) The 'betas' used to calculate 'predicted' returns were average
betas for the five years ending June 1976. Ideally the beta
for each company for each year should be computed, but even
then the standard error of the betas thereby computed are very
large for individual firms. The effects of changes in finan-
cial leverage and changes in the nature of each firms business
will not be fully shown in this study.
3) The measurement of each of the variables used has significant
methodological difficulties - as with all such studies.
4) High levels of collinearity between some of the independent
variables impedes interpretation of the results.
5) Some of the relationships hypothesised as being linear in this
study may not in fact be linear.
6) No conclusions can be drawn for firms outside the size range
chosen in this study.
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APPENDIX A
The study used data from the top fifty companies listed in the 1977
Fortune 500 for the years 1972 to 1976 inclusive, with the exception of
three companies whose histories were not directly traceable for this per-
iod. There were thus forty seven companies with five observations for
each. The companies studied were as follows:
1) Exxon 21) Westinghouse
2) General Motors 22) Goodyear
3) Ford Motor 23) Phillips Petroleum
4) Texaco 24) Dow Chemicals
5) Mobil 25) Occidental Petroleum
6) Standard Oil of California 26) International Harvester
7) Gulf Oil 27) Eastman Kodak
8) IBM 28) Sun Oil
9) General Electric 29) Union Oil of California
10) Chrysler 30) RCA
11) ITT 31) Esmark
12) Standard Oil of Indiana 32) Bethlehem Steel
13) Shell oil 33) Rockwell International
14) U.S. Steel 34) Caterpillar Tractor
15) Atlantic Richfield 35) Kraftco
16) Du Pont 36) Beatrice Foods
17) Continental Oil 37) LTV
18) Procter and Gamble 38) Xerox
19) Tenneco 39) RJ Reynolds
20) Union Carbide 40) Monsanto
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Ashland Oil
General Foods
Firestone
Boeing
45) Amerada Hess
46) Greyhound
47) WR Grace
41)
42)
43)
44)
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APPENDIX B
Information sources for the data and a description of the calculation
of derived data are tabulated below. All dollar units are in current
dollars.
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Description Name Units Source
1. Chief Executive Officers CEOPAY $ FORBES Annual
salary, bonus, directors 'Roster of the
fees, deferred compensa- U.S.'s biggest
tion. (Excludes stock corporations'.
options).
2. As above, lagged forward CELAG1 $
one year.
3. As above, lagged forward CELAG2 $
two years.
4. Change in pay: calculated DCEOl $
as CELAG1 minus CEOPAY
5. Change in pay: calculated DCE02 $
as CELAG2 minus CELAGl.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Description Name Units Source
1. Sales - For detailed defi-
nition see Fortune, May
1977 p. 386
2. As sales - lagged forward
one year
SALES
SALES 1
'000 $
'000 $
FORTUNE.
Annual '500
largest indus-
trials.'
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (CON'T)
Description Name Units Source
3. Change in sales, calculated
as SALES1 minus SALES
4. Value weighted return from
investing in the New York
Stock Exchange index.
Dividends reinvested, tax
exemption, cash to portfolio.
5. Return on short term treasury
bills. One year to maturity
Hold six months. Interest
reinvested. Tax exempts.
6. The sytematic risk or 'Beta'
of the firms ordinary shares,
averaged for the previous five
years.
7. Market value of the firms
Equity shares (ordinary) at
the beginning of the year.
8. Return to investors of holding
the firms stock for the year.
Dividends and capital gains -
see FORTUNE, May 1977 p.3 8 6
9. As 8, lagged forward 1 year.
DSALES
ZM
RF
BETA
MARVAL
RETURN
RETUR1
'000 $
%/
'A half century
of returns on
stocks and bonds.'
L. Fisher, J.
Lorie. Chicago.
The University
of Chicago Gra-
duate School of
Business 1977.
Same as ZM
Merrill Lynch
Pierce Fenner
and Smith.
'security risk
evaluation'
June 1976.
FORBES - As
above.
FORTUNE - As
above.
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (CON'T)
Description Name Units Source
10. Value of return to investors TOTRET '000 $
for holding the firms stock
for the year, calculated as
RETURN multiplied by NARVAL
11. As 10, lagged forward 1 year. TOTREl '000 $
12. Return above or below that CAPM %
expected under the capital
asset pricing model, calcu-
lated as RETURN minus (RF +
BETA(ZM-RF)).
13. As 12, lagged forward 1 year. CAPM1 %
14. Value of return above or ALPHA '000 $
below that expected under
the capital asset pricing
model, calculated as CAP
multiplied by NARVAL.
15. As above, lagged forward one ALPHA1 '000 $
year.
For more detailed description of the assumptions and methodology behind
the source variables consultthe original sources.
APPENDIX C
RESULTS
18. DCE01
Independent (Coefficient)
Variables-Significant (Sign)
Independent
Variables-Insignificant
Adjusted
R2
I t I
C (+)
C (+)
SALES (+)
MARVAL (+)
C (+)
C (+)
SALES(+)
SALES(+)
SALES(+)
SALES(+)
SALES (+)
SALES(+)
SALES (+)
SALES(+)
SALES(+)
SALES(+)
DSALES(+)
DSALES(+)
C (+)
C (+)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
CEOPAY
CEOPAY
CEOPAY
CEOPAY
CEOPAY
CEOPAY
CEOPAY
CEOPAY
CEOPAY
CEOPAY
CEOPAY
CELAG1
CELAG1
CELAG1
CELAG1
CELAGI
DCE01
RETURN
TOTRET
ALPHA
CAPM
CAPM
TOTRET
MARVAL
RETURN
MARVAL
ALPHA
CAPM
TOTREl
ALPHA1
C
C
-. 003
-. 002
.3629
.1092
.0017
-. 002
.3630
.3625
.3631
.3762
.3656
.2963
.2816
.2860
.2799
.3006
.1016
.0944
Observations
235
235
235
235
235
235
235
235
235
235
235
188
188
188
188
188
188
188
Dependent
Variable
C(+)
C(+)
C(+)
ALPHA(-)
C (+)
TOTRET(+)
C (+)
C (+)
C (+)
RETURN(+)
C (+)
C(+)
C(+)
APPENDIX C RESULTS (CON'T)
I I
Independent (Coefficient)
Variables-Significant (Sign)
Independent
Variables-Insignificant
Adjusted
R2
I I
RETUR1(+)
C (+)
C (+)
C (+)
C (+)
C(+)
C (+)
C (+)
C (+)
ALPHAl (+)
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
CAPM1 C
C
TOTRET
NARVAL
ALPHA
CAPM
RETURN
DSALES(-)
DSALES(-)
CAPN1
____________________________________________________ 
I ___________________________________________________________________________
.0956
.1181
.2156
.2151
.2147
.2139
.2140
.0886
.0766
.0368
.1258
Observ4tions
188
188
141
141
141
141
141
141
141
141
141
Dependent
Variable
DCE01
DCE01
CELAG2
CELAG2
CELAG2
CELAG2
CELAG2
DCE02
DCE02
DCE02
DCE02
DSALES(+)
DSALES(+)
SALES (+)
SALES (+)
SALES (+)
SALES (+)
SALES (+)
TOTREl (+)
RETUR1 (+)
DSALES(-)
DSALES (-) C (+)
01%
00
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APPENDIX D
CORRELATION MATRICES FOR INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
SALES MARVAL RETURN TOTRET CAPM ALPHA
SALES 1
NARVAL .4772 1
RETURN .0502 -.1418 1
TOTRET .1601 -.0545 .5638 1
CAPM .0054 -.1031 .6524 .3049 1
ALPHA .0809 -.0923 .4439 .6243 .6106 1
DSALES RETURI TOTREl CAPM1 ALPHAl
DSALES 1
RETUR1 -.1207 1
TOTREl -.0262 .5741 1
CAPM1 -.0179 .6407 .3103 1
ALPHAl -.0733 .4293 .6074 .6167 1
